Federal Tax Restructuring and State
and Local Governments: An
Introduction to the Issues and the
Literature

MICHAEL MAZEROV,* DAN R. BUCKS,** AND
MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION***

The course of events in both the second session of the 104th Congress
and the 1996 presidential campaign has significantly reduced the
likelihood that a major restructuring of the federal tax system will be
initiated in 1997. House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill
Archer-arguably the single individual with the greatest control over
whether and when a serious effort to overhaul the federal tax system
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goes forward-has recently acknowledged that marking up legislation in
1997 is no longer feasible:
[S]uch a massive undertaking is going to have to have broad consensus and
bipartisan support within this country. That consensus is not there yet, because
the information is not yet there .
. . . [U]ltimately the president needs to be convinced this is the right thing
Clearly, we are going to have to resolve differences within the Republican
Party before we are going to be able to complete a structural replacement of the
income tax . . . .1

The delay in Congress' timetable is a welcome development for those
who appreciate how far-reaching the impact of substituting a comprehensive consumption tax for the existing federal personal and corporate
income taxes would be on state and local tax systems and fiscal capacity.
In no other area is the information gap that Representative Archer
referred to more evident than with respect to the effect of major federal
tax changes on our system of federalism. Failure to appreciate and to
address the effects of federal tax restructuring on state and local
governments could undermine not only one of its primary
goals-administrative simplification-but also the current thrust of
federal domestic policy-making generally: devolution of substantial
service responsibility to states and localities.
I.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE RELIANCE ON THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX "INFRASTRUCTURE"

We have been actively writing and speaking on this subject for more
than a year and a half. The testimony of the Multistate Tax Commission
submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee on May 1, 1996,
which follows this introduction, encapsulates our analysis. It emphasizes
what seems to us to be the most superficially obvious and, at the same
time, the least appreciated impact on state and local tax systems of
substituting any contemplated version of a consumption tax for the
existing federal personal and corporate income taxes: the effective repeal
of state personal and/or corporate income taxes as well. In adopting a
federal starting point for the calculation of these taxes-as virtually all
of them do--states have chosen to rely on the full range of Internal
Revenue Service activities that are required to administer both taxes in
an effective and equitable manner. These activities include developing
regulations to define items of taxable income and allowable deductions,

I. John Godfrey, Archer Outlines 1997 Tax Agenda, 73 TAX NOTES, 11, 11-12
(Oct. 7, 1996).
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requiring their reporting to federal authorities (information that is either
simultaneously reported to or shared with the states), auditing a
significant sample of taxpayers (particularly under the corporate tax),
and, if need be, pursuing disputable issues through the courts. No state
could cost effectively preserve a traditional personal or corporate income
tax in the absence of the federal administrative and legal infrastructure
comprised of the IRS and the Internal Revenue Code.
Beyond practical issues of cost lie fundamental questions of law. It
seems highly unlikely that states would be able to compel companies,
over which they lack personal jurisdiction, to report income they provide
to the state's residents. Therefore, if Company A does not purposefully
direct commercial activity to State B, State B cannot likely require
Company A to report dividends or interest it pays to Mr. C, one of State
B's residents. Indeed, State B cannot compel reporting of Mr. C's
taxable wages if they are earned outside of State B. Absent mandatory
reporting of income to the federal government, it cannot be effectively
taxed at the state level-at least not without a level of state auditing that
would be unacceptable for both political and fiscal reasons.
Now, as the Commission's testimony makes clear, there are significant
differences among the various consumption tax proposals in the degree
to which they render infeasible the maintenance of either existing state
personal and corporate income taxes or broad-based substitutes for them.
For example, the Nunn-Domenici "unlimited savings allowance (USA)
tax"2 would permit states to preserve a traditional ability-to-pay-based
personal income tax, because income from capital would continue to be
reported. 3 Both the USA tax and the various "flat tax" bills4 based on
the Hall-Rabushka proposal5 would permit states to substitute a broadbased, apportioned, "subtraction-method" value-added tax for their
existing corporate income taxes. (In this regard, the significance of the

2. S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
3. However, see the discussion in the Multistate Tax Commission Testimony to
the House Ways and Means Committee on the "source taxation" problem created under
the USA tax by the heightened incentives it would provide for individuals to retire to
states not taxing consumed income. Dan R. Bucks, Federal Tax Restructuring: Perils
and Possibilities for the States; Testimony to the House Ways and Means Committee of
the U.S. House of Representatives, May 1, 1996, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1468 (1996)
[hereinafter Bucks, MTC Testimony].
4. See, e.g., S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 488, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
5. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995).
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U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of
Treasury, 6 upholding the apportionability of the Michigan "single
business tax," cannot be overstated.) On the other hand, the wholesale
substitution of a transactional consumption tax (such as a European
"credit-invoice" value-added tax or the national retail sales tax7) for the
federal personal/corporate income tax structure would, in our judgment,
leave states no choice but to repeal their corporate personal income taxes
as well. (That is, unless Congress affirmatively chose to preserve state
income taxation by requiring continued reporting of profits, wages,
personal income from capital ownership, etc.)
We remain convinced that the most significant implications for state
and local tax systems of federal tax restructuring flow from its effects on
the administrative and legal infrastructure that would (or would not) be
available to states following enactment. Although this view is admittedly debatable, we would urge state tax officials to continue placing
primary emphasis on these administrative issues--if for no other reason
than that so many federal policy-makers "inside the Beltway" seem
incapable of recognizing them.
The most glaring example of an inability to "see the forest for the
trees" is provided by a Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) study, Impact
on State and Local Governments and Tax-Exempt. Organizations of
Replacing the Federal Income Tax,8 prepared for the hearing to which
the Commission submitted the testimony reprinted in this Symposium. 9
After correctly noting that "[b]ecause most of the states that collect
individual and corporate income taxes model their state income tax
systems after the Federal income tax system, any significant restructuring
of the Federal income tax system could have considerable corollary
implications for such states," the JCT simply observed that ."the
elimination of a Federal income tax and replacement with a consumption-based tax would entail a considerable increase in the complexity and
expense of administering a state income tax system." 10 While devoting
seventeen full pages to an analysis of the implications of federal tax
restructuring for the implicit federal subsidy afforded by the tax
exemption for interest on state and local government debt, II the JCT
apparently did not regard the "expense of administering a state income

6. 498 U.S. 358 (1991).
7. H.R. 3039, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
8. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS OF
REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (Joint Comm. Print 1996).
9. Bucks, MTC Testimony, supra note 3.
10. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 8, at 70.
11. Id. at 84-100.
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tax system" in the absence of analogous federal taxes---let alone the
fundamental feasibility of doing so--as an issue worthy of even a
sentence! When it turned its attention to the complete replacement of
the federal income tax by a national retail sales tax, the JCT seemed to
view adapting to a new, broader sales tax base as the states' most
significant problem. 12 Readers will search the JCT report in vain for
an analysis of whether states could maintain income taxes in the
complete absence_ of a federal income tax and, if not, of the federal
government's ability to administer a twenty percent retail sales tax in an
environment in which states and localities would need to raise their
combined sales tax rates to approximately the fifteen percent level to
replace their personal and corporate income taxes.
IL

THE OTHER MAJOR ISSUES FOR STATES AND LOCALITIES

The narrowing of state and local tax policy choices, relative to those
currently available, is a thread joining all of the major proposals for
federal tax restructuring. However, it is not the only effect on states and
localities of enacting a federal consumption tax. Two years into the
current discussion there is, finally, a rich literature on this topic. Rather
than attempt to discuss or pass judgment on issues that have already
been thoroughly analyzed by others, we will simply summarize five
other major implications for state and local taxation and fiscal capacity
that have been identified and refer readers to articles that focus on these
issues:
(1)
To varying degrees, federal consumption taxes may subject state
and local governments themselves to direct federal taxation. 13 Theoretical justifications exist for taxing state and local governments either as
collective consumers (e.g., of the value of goods and services to build
roads, police cars, and even the personal services provided by their
employees) or as producers of public services. 14 The administrative
and political infeasibility of adding a federal sales tax or VAT to state
and local tax bills makes it inore likely that such governments would be
charged sales tax or VAT on their purchases. Under the flat tax, state

12.
13.

Id. at 71.

The most in-depth discussion of these issues may be found in STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 10, at 49-70.
14. Id. at 52-58.
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and local governments would be subject to direct taxation on the value
of fringe benefits provided to their employees. 15 Either approach
would make it more difficult for state and local governments to achieve
balanced budgets with existing revenue levels. 16
(2)
Certain possible macroeconomic effects of federal tax restructuring could have significant impacts on state and local government
revenue-raising capacity. 17 While these effects are a matter of considerable dispute among economists, they nonetheless warrant consideration
in any thorough analysis of the implications for state and local govern~
ments of implementing a federal consumption tax. Three major issues
are most commonly discussed.
·
First, some economists assert that elimination of current tax preferences for owner-occupied housing (principally the mortgage interest and
property tax deductions) would result, at least in the short term, in a
significant drop in home values. Because owner-occupied homes
represent a major share of local property tax bases, this could lead to a
reduction in local property tax revenues in the absence of offsetting tax
rate increases. (It should be kept in mind that many local governments
are subject to legal limitations on their authority to raise property tax
rates.)
Second, because the hallmark of consumption taxation is the
elimination of taxation on the return to new investment, some economists assert that the value of existing investments could drop significantly. (A fierce debate rages as to whether transition rules should be
adopted to help preserve the relative value of the existing capital stock.)
Just as in the case of home values, a drop in the value of existing farms,
rental housing, and commercial and industrial real estate and equipment
could have a significant downward impact on local property tax bases
and tax collections.
Third, the wholesale shift of the federal tax system from taxation of
income to taxation of consumption could lead to a significant decrease
in national consumer expenditures and a corresponding increase in the
national savings rate. (Achieving this result is, of course, one of the

15. Id. at 34.
16. A study by the staff of the California Franchise Tax Board has estimated that
this provision of the flat tax would cost California and its local governments $2.6 billion
annually. Economics and Statistical Research Bureau, Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., The
Impact of the Flat Tax on California, at 64 (1995).
17. The most thorough discussion of these issues may be found in Gerald E. Auten
& Eric J. Toder, Federal Consumption Tax Proposals and the States, The Sales Tax in
the 21st Century (William F. Fox & Matthew Murray eds.) (manuscript on file with
author); and DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, CONSUMPTION-BASED TAX REFORM AND THE
STATE-LOCAL SECTOR 476-77 (1996).
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principal objectives of advocates of a federal consumption tax.) Given
the substantial reliance of state and· 1ocal governments on consumption
taxation (sales and excise taxes account for thirty-five percent of state
and local tax revenues and twenty-five percent of own-source revenues),18 a significant nationwide drop in consumption could reduce
state and local revenues in the absence of offsetting tax .rate increases or
base-broadening.
·
(3)
All of the major proposals for federal consumption taxes would
eliminate the remaining ability of individuals to deduct state and local
income and property taxes in determining their federal tax liability. (The
USA tax and the flat tax do not permit such deductions in calculating
their respective household-level taxes; the national retail sales tax and a
credit-invoice VAT would, of course, eliminate household tax filing
entirely). As was exhaustively discussed during the debate on eliminating state and local tax deductibility that occurred during development of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, eliminating deductibility increases the
effective "tax price" of state and local. services. 19 The possibly
attendant affects that expert observers have identified20 include: (a)
immediate taxpayer pressures for reduction in state and local taxes and
spending; (b) greater taxpayer resistance to tax increases that may be
sought in the future; (c) taxpayer resistance to state and local tax and
spending policies that tend to redistribute income or tax burdens from
upper income segments of the population to lower income segments
(since upper income taxpayers are most likely to itemize state and local
tax deductions on their federal returns and therefore experience a tax
increase resulting from the elimination of deductibility); and (d)

18. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series GB/92-5, Government Finances: 1991-92,
at 7 (1996).
19. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT
A-97, STRENGTHENING THE FEDERAL REVENUE SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE AND
LOCAL TAXING AND BORROWING 37-66 (1984); Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Exporting,
Federal Deductibility, and the Tax Structure, 12 J. OF PoL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 109
(1993); Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect ofFederal Tax Deductibility
on State and Local Taxes and Spending, 95 J. OF POL. ECON. 710 (1987).
20. Again, we wish to emphasize that we are not attempting to evaluate the
accuracy of these predictions or taking a position on their desirability. Many economists
who would agree with the predictions believe the outcomes are desirable, that is, that
federal tax policy should not shield state and.local taxpayers from the full "tax price"
of state and local services because it leads to economically inefficient levels of demand
for such services. See generally Metcalf, supra note 19; Feldstein & Metcalf, supra note
19.
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pressures to shift the burden of state and local taxes away from
household taxes and toward business taxes (since under most federal
consumption tax proposals businesses may continue to deduct state and
local taxes as ordinary business expenses).
(4)
All major proposals for a federal consumption tax either reduce
(in the case of the USA tax) or eliminate (all others) the implicit federal
subsidy afforded by the federal tax exemption for interest paid on state
and local government borrowings. 21 Again, the ultimate impact of
eliminating this subsidy on the interest cost of state and local government is a matter of debate among economists; it depends critically on the
impact on interest rates, generally, of shifting to a federal consumption
tax (which is itself a matter of debate). Any increase in the interest
costs of state and local governments is significant, since collectively they
paid $65 billion in interest in FY92, and these costs equaled eight
percent of their own-source revenues. 22
(5)
Federal adoption of a transactional consumption tax (either a
national retail sales tax or a credit-invoice VAT) would raise a host of
issues for existing state and local sales taxes quite apart from all of those
previously discussed. 23 In one way or another, the issues revolve
·around competition between, and coordination of, the federal and
state/local taxes. Some impacts on state and local sales taxation that
have been postulated include: (a) "crowding out" of the state and local
sales tax base by the federal tax, e.g., political pressure for immediate
reductions in state and local sales taxes or against future increases,
because voters have a limited tolerance for taxation of any particular
base; (b) political pressure brought by the business community (which
of course must collect transactional taxes) for either mandatory
conformity of the state and local sales tax base to the federal base or
elimination of state/local sales taxes entirely and substitution of revenue
sharing; and (c) a similar issue of tax base definition autonomy, and an
additional issue of the adequacy of federal reimbursement of state costs,
if states were either to be mandated or given the option to administer a
21. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 8, at 84-100. See also
Hearing on the Impact on State and Local Governments and Tax-Exempt Entities of
Replacing the Federal Income Tax Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (various written submissions of state and local government
organizations). Again, we are not taking a position on the appropriateness of such a
subsidy from a public policy standpoint.
22. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 18, at 6-7.
23. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 19,
at 93-99; Charles E. McLure, Jr., State and Local Implications of a Federal Value Added
Tax, 38 TAX NOTES 1517 (March 28, 1988); Alan Schenk, Choosing the Form ofa
Federal Value-Added Tax: Implications for State and Local Retail Sales Taxes, 22 CAP.
U. L. REV. 291, 311-18 (1993).
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federal transactional tax for the federal government. Other experts have
stressed that numerous positive benefits could flow from the states'
administration of a federal transactional consumption tax. 24
III.

CONCLUSION

While they have received relatively little serious attention to date, we
believe that the potential impacts on state and local government should
be viewed by Congress as among the two or three most important issues
it must study as it explores restructuring the federal tax system over the
next several years. Some of the potential impacts discussed in this
introduction, and the Commission testimony that follows, may be
inherent in substituting a theoretically pure consumption tax for our
current federal personal and corporate income taxes. However, Congress
has the power to diverge from theoretical purity in pursuit of other,
arguably legitimate, public policy goals (e.g., to preserve tax incentives
for owner-occupied housing, as Senator Spector proposed in his version
of the flat tax). Congress also has the power to take other steps to
mitigate the impact of these proposals on states and localities (e.g., to
maintain a structure of mandatory reporting to the federal government
of personal income from capital ownership, so that states would have the
option of continuing traditional income taxes even if the federal
government itself adopted a flat tax).
We hope that the analysis and references to other writings offered here
will be useful to state and local officials, private practitioners, and those
who believe that a vital state and local public sector is an essential
element of a productive American economy. We hope that they will be
motivated to educate members of Congress about the fundamental
significance, for our federal system, of the decisions regarding the
federal tax system that they may soon be making.

24. See Ernest J. Dronenburg, SAFCT: State Administered Federal Consumption
Tax: The Case for State Administration of a Federal Tax (Nov. 20, 1995) (paper
prepared for the New York University Annual State and Local Taxation Conference, on ,
file with author); John A. Miller, State Administration of a National Sales Tax: A New
Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 9 VA. TAX REV. 243 (1989).
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APPENDIX A

TESTIMONY TO THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE OF THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY 1, 1996 FEDERAL TAX
RESTRUCTURING: PERILS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR THE STATES
DAN R. BUCKS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION

An historic debate is developing over the nature of the federal tax
system. Several national leaders are seeking to replace federal income
taxes with consumption or other taxes that shift the tax burden away
from capital income._ Each of these proposals will affect state fiscal
systems in fundamental ways.
The central irony of the emerging debate is that while the federal
government is transferring expenditure responsibility to the states, most
of the major tax changes would effectively reduce the tax policy choices
available to states. State officials need to be engaged in this discussion
to preserve the vitality of federalism.
This Artiqle reviews three major variants of consumption taxes
advocated by various Members of Congress:
•
the national retail sales tax (NRST) introduced by Representatives
Dan Schaefer (R-CO), Billy Tauzin (D-LA) and Dick Chrysler
(R-Ml). (This bill is House Bill 3039). 1 Senator Richard Lugar
(R-IN) has also advocated a national sales tax, although he has
not yet introduced legislation;
the flat tax proposed by Representative Richard Armey (R-TX)
and Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) and a variant thereof
introduced by Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA). · (These bills are
House Bill 2060,2 Senate Bill 1050,3 and Senate Bill 488,4
respectively); and

1.

2.
3.
4.
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H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
S. 1050. 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
S. 488, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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•

the unlimited savings allowance (USA) tax introduced by
Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Pete Domenici (R-NM). (This
bill is Senate Bill 722). 5
A transactional value-added tax (VAT) is also discussed because its
impact on states closely parallels the proposed National Retail Sales Tax.
However, although proposals for such a VAT have been introduced in
the 104th Congress, they are discussed only briefly because they have
not been proposed as a substitute for the existing federal personal and
corporate income taxes. 6 Finally, a fifth proposal, by Representative
Richard Gephardt, is not reviewed here because it does not propose
major changes in federal taxation of business.
Each of the plans discussed here is intended to improve the U.S.
savings rate by shifting the burden of taxation to consumption and by
providing direct or indirect incentives for investment and savings.
Because each of the proposals takes a different form, they will affect
state tax systems in different ways. Nonetheless, with respect to state
taxation, the proposals share a common characteristic: Compared to
current circumstances, all of the proposals would leave the states with
fewer tax policy choices.
The current structure of federal and state tax systems combines
consumption taxes--state sales taxes-with ''ability to pay" taxes--federal, state, and local income taxes. If the federal government
moves to a consumption tax, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for
states to maintain "ability to pay" income taxes in their revenue mix.

5. S. 722, 104th Cong., !st Sess. (1995). Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) has also
advocated substituting the Boren-Danforth Business Activities Tax (BAT), a "subtraction-method" value-added tax, for the existing corporate income tax. · See Scrambling
to Pay the Bills: Building Allies for America's Working Families, February 28, 1996,
pp. 17-19. Most of the observations made here regarding the business-level tax
embodied in the Nunn-Domenici USA plan apply with equal force to the Boren-Danforth
BAT. The Boren-Danforth BAT was proposed in the Comprehensive Tax Restructuring
and Simplification Act of 1994, S. 2160, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Note:
Subsequent to the Ways and Means Committee Hearing, Representative Sam Gibbons
(D-FL), introduced H.R. 4050, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), the "Revenue Restructuring
Act of 1996." H.R. 4050 also proposes a subtraction-method valued-added tax, in this
case as a substitute for federal personal and corporate income taxes and Social Security
and Medicare taxes.
6. See the VATs proposed in the Deficit and Debt Reduction and Health Care
Financing Act of 1995 introduced as S. 237, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), by Senator
Ernest Hollings (D-SC) and in the National Health Insurance Act introduced as H.R. 16,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), by Representative John Dingell (D-Ml).
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Administering a state individual or corporation income tax without a
·federal tax would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for nearly all
states. To a large degree, states currently rely on federal income tax
definitions of income, expense, and other relevant items and begin state
tax computations from a federal starting point. In addition, states rely
extensively on federal audit and compliance programs for their own
purposes and are reliant as well on federal information reporting and
withholding rules for their own administration. Without this infrastructure, it is unlikely that states would be able to administer an income tax
without substantial additional capacity and without additional complexity
to taxpayers. They may also run into constitutional issues that would
prevent effective administration, especially with respect to requiring
information reporting by out-of-state corporations. Ultimately, these
constitutional issues may prove to be the greatest barrier to continued
state use of income taxes in the absence of a federal income tax. Thus,
the proposed federal tax changes will narrow the diversity of tax policies
available to the states, and the entire federal/state fiscal system will shift
to various forms of consumption taxes.
I.

THE FEDERALISM lMPACTS--BRIEFLY

Space does not allow for a full discussion of the impact of each
proposal on our system of federalism. This high-level assessment of the
three major plans demonstrates, however, that the impacts are significant
and vary somewhat among them.
(1) National Retail Sales Tax. Replacing the federal income tax with
a single transactional tax, such as the Schaefer/Tauzin/Chrysler NRST
or a Euro-VAT, will also require that states shift in large part to such a
tax. As noted above, it seems unlikely in the extreme that a state could
effectively maintain and administer an income tax in the absence of a
federal counterpart. Thus, a primary federalism impact of these
transaction tax proposals is that states would no longer have the option
of including ability-to-pay income taxes in their tax mix.
With all income taxes repealed, a single tax base-consumption-would be used to finance the majority of federal and state services and
a substantial share of local services. No other major industrialized
country relies to such a high degree on transactional consumption taxes;
instead they typically mix consumption and ability-to-pay income taxes
much as the states do now. 7

7. This heavy reliance is likely to lead to higher rates than some envision. The
15% rate included in the Schaefer/Tauzin/Chrysler NRST does not acknowledge the need
of states to find a replacement for their income tax receipts. After accounting for the
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The limits on policy ch~ices would be especially dramatic in the five
states that do not now levy a state sales tax: Alaska, Delaware,
Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon. Sales taxes are a divisive issue
in these states, and indeed Montana and Oregon voters have specifically
rejected such taxes in referenda on several occasions. Yet, under an
NRST or a Euro-VAT, these states would likely have to abandon their
traditional reliance, qn income taxes. The impact on · these states
highlights in the extreme the constraints placed on the policy choices of
all states under a shift to a federal transactional consumption tax.
An NRST or a Euro-VAT would also raise the key federalism issue
of the autonomy allowed states to define the bases (and perhaps rates)
of state sales taxes or VATs. Admirably, the Schaefer/Tauzin/Chrysler
NRST leaves states free to retain their own sales taxes and opt-out of
administering the federal tax: Whether such a dual system would be
politically sustainable in the long run is open to question, however. It
seems likely that the American business community would apply intense
pressure for mandatory consolidation, and it is true that a consolidated
federal-state tax would be easier to administer for taxpayers and tax
administrators alike. ·
However, consolidation of the two levels of taxation would mean that
Congress would control the structure of state retail sales taxes. And,
given that these proposals may compel states to abandon income taxes,
the result is congressional control of the major share of the general fund
revenues of most states. This control could even theoretically lead over
time to congressional earmarking or restraining of the uses of state
revenues. If the NRST or Euro-VAT leads to states losing the authority
to determine tax policy for themselves, the balance of power in our
federal system will shift profoundly in favor of the national government.
Others may argue that the loss ·of autonomy in tax policy will be
outweighed by the efficiency benefits to the national economy arising
from a common national tax. Proponents could also argue that states
will enjoy the revenue benefits of Congress enacting a tax base that is
broader than most states have been able to adopt on their own. Whether
need to replace state income taxes, plus the likelihood that the final tax base will be
narrower than the pure consumption base used to calculate the 15% rate, the final
combined federal-state-local tax rate necessary to raise revenues equal to federal and
state income taxes, plus current state and·local sales taxes, would be in the 30% to 40%
range. Similarly, the rate for a Euro-VAT would likely be much higher than its
advocates anticipate.
·
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the federal base would remain immune over time to the ·inevitable
process · of exemptions and special exceptions is yet to be seen,
however. 8
There is also no assurance that Congress, after gaining control of the
federal and state tax base, will retain the benefits of national uniformity.
Indeed, Congress has prohibited states from taxing certain "govemmentsponsored enterprises," such as "Fannie-Mae," while continuing to
subject such enterprises to federal income taxation.
The stakes in this debate between economic efficiency and political
autonomy are very high for the states. The authority to determine tax
policy is a core element of sovereignty. With that power comes the
independence to set expenditure priorities. Ultimately, the combination
of the repeal of federal income taxes and mandated conformity to a
federal transactional tax would make states much more dependent on the
federal government.
Space does not permit a discussion of all the important issues raised
for states in the context of a National Retail Sales Tax. The proposal for
states to administer the Schaefer/Tauzin/Chrysler National Retail Sales
Tax deserves serious consideration. 9 State administration likely ensures
greater attention to details important to states as well as to issues of
national importance. State administration might also provide a means of
resolving the use tax nexus issue; interstate sales would be taxed under
a national sales tax, and it would make little sense to have the states
administer a federal tax on such sales while remaining effectively
powerless to tax them themselves.
(2) Nunn-Domenici USA Plan. The tax plan proposed by Senators
Nunn and Domenici combines a "federalism friendly" operational
(Michigan-style) VAT with a consumed income tax that has the potential
to divide the states.
At the business tax level, Nunn-Domenici propose a subtractionmethod VAT that would be administered like an income tax. Such a tax

8. Moreover, it is not certain that a federal NRST base that will (presumably)
include most household purchases of services will necessarily be appreciably larger than
existing state sales tax bases. States currently tax significant amounts of business inputs,
which will be exempted under a national sales tax because taxing them at rates as high
as 15-20% would lead to significant economic distortions. The expansion of the state
sales tax base to include household services may not do much more than compensate
states for the loss of the sales. tax base comprised of such business inputs.
9. A member of the California State Board of Equalization (the agency charged
with responsibility for administering that state'.s sales tax) has set forth a detailed
proposal for state administration of a national sales tax. See Ernest J. Dronenburg, Jr.,
"SAFCT: State Administered Federal Consumption Tax: The Case for State Administration of a Federal Tax," paper prepared for the New York University Annual State and
Local Taxation Conference, November 30, 1995.
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is "federalism-friendly" because states could readily "piggyback" on
what would be a robust, broad-based tax. States could simply transport
their current apportionment formulas from the corporate income tax
arena to the new operational VAT. Michigan's experience---especially
with the U.S. Supreme Court's approval of apportioning an operational
VAT in Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury 10-serves as a
model for other states. New Hampshire as well now has several years
of experience with administering an operational VAT.
The Nunn-Domenici operational VAT would also benefit states by
reducing problems created under the corporate income tax by the
artificial shifting of income overseas via transfer pricing. The NunnDomenici plan alleviates the transfer pricing problem because export
sales are exempt from the tax and import purchases are taxed. (In
technical terms, it is a "border-adjusted" VAT.)
While the business tax portion of the Nunn-Domenici plan is workable
from a federalism perspective, the individual consumed income tax may
be a different matter. 11 The "source tax" issue that arose in conjunction
with pensions, IRAs and other tax-deferred retirement income would be
magnified under the USA plan. 12 A person could add to savings and
receive a deduction while a resident of a consumed income tax state, but
then retire to a low-rate or non-income tax state. 13 The incentive to
retire to such a state would greatly increase relative to the current
situation because the exemption (or low rate) would apply not only to
pension benefits but to all savings vehicles.
States could de-couple from the USA savings deduction without
creating severe administrative complications. However, there would
likely be significant political difficulties in eliminating at the state level
a federal tax deduction that would be popular with individuals who have
significant savings.

10. 498 U.S. 358 (1991).
11. Under the proposal, the individual tax base would be equal to income from
wages, interest, capital gains, and dividends, less net additions to savings.
12. Congress recently preempted the authority of states to tax, under the source
principle, IRS-qualified pension and certain other deferred compensation benefits paid
to former residents. See Act of January 6, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-95, 109 Stat. 979
(1996).
13. The issue will be exacerbated to the degree that individuals are able to borrow
funds, up to certain limits under the USA plan, to increase their savings deduction.
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A federalism advantage of the USA plan is that it does not interfere
with the operation of state sales taxes. A federalism disadvantage is that
states may find it difficult to retain a traditional "ability-to-pay" income
tax. However, that difficulty appears to be more political than technical
or administrative, since interest, dividend, and capital gain income would
continue to be reported to and audited by the federal government.
·
(3) Armey-Shelby and Specter Flat Taxes. These plans aim at the
goal of corporate tax integration, whereby all income is theoretically
taxed only once. There is no taxation of consumed wage income twice
as there is under the USA plan, 14 and there is no taxation of corporate
business profits twice as is commonly alleged in the current system.
Business profits and employee fringe benefits (except pensions) are taxed
at the business entity level. Wages, salaries, and pension benefits are
taxed at the individual level. Senator Specter's plan would allow for the
deduction of home mortgage interest and charitable contributions; the
Armey/Shelby flat tax would not.
States could readily piggyback on the business operational VAT
contained in both these flat tax plans, just as they could in the USA
plan. Unlike the USA plan, however, transfer pricing remains a problem
because the Armey/Shelby and Specter flat taxes do not qualify as
"border adjustable" taxes. Hence, export sales are taxable, and import
purchases are deductible as business inputs. Therefore, the same
incentives to under-price exports to related foreign parties and to
overprice imports from related foreign suppliers exist as under the
current corporate income tax. Moreover, without the "backstop" of
taxation of repatriated dividends, income once shifted overseas by U.S.
multinational corporations is removed from the U.S. tax base forever.
Allowing global enterprises to shift income through transfer pricing is
a major federal policy failure, and under these flat tax proposals it
becomes even more important to solve this problem. On the other hand,
the reduction of tax rates under the flat tax relative to the current
corporate income tax may decrease the incentive for artificial income
shifting somewhat.
The individual tax proposed in the Armey/Shelby and Specter flat tax
proposals is designed in a manner that would make it difficult to
impossible for states to retain a traditional individual income tax, which
includes interest, d1vidends, and capital gains in the base. The administrative infrastructure for the taxation of these types of income would no

14. Consumed wages are taxed at the individual level under the USA tax, and,
because they are not deductible from the business tax base, they are effectively taxed at
that level as well.
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longer exist because of the elimination of the information reporting on
these items. States that prefer a traditional income tax as a part of their
fiscal mix would effectively no longer have that choice. 15 On the other
hand, as with the USA plan, a federalism benefit of the flat tax plans is
that states could retain their sales taxes without inherent federal
interference.

II.

POSSIBILITIES

While major change in the federal tax system will present challenges
to states and localities, it may also produce an opportunity to improve
the operation of tax systems at all levels of government. Such improvements would likely require coordination and cooperation between
federal, state, and local governments. State officials should be full
partners with federal officials in exploring such potential improvements.
Interstate compacts between Congress and participating states should
be explored as the mechanism most consistent with federalism for
mitigating potential adverse impacts on the states from federal tax
changes and for maximizing the benefits of coordination among federal,
state, and local taxes. 16 Interstate compacts, freely entered into by
states, could forestall congressional imposition of tax policy on the
states. At the same time, interstate compacts provide a means of
voluntarily harmonizing otherwise separate and potentially disparate tax
policies. Compacts are especially called for if the federal government

15. This narrowing of tax policy choices for the states might be potentially
mitigated were Congress to empower states with the ability to require income
information reporting by out-of-state companies or to continue to collect the information
and share it with states on a cost-reimbursement basis. States, in tum, could cooperate
through an interstate compact that would provide a basic, uniform legal structure for
state income taxes. Such an approach would be consistent with federalism and would
avoid forcing all the states into a "one size fits all" tax system controlled only by
Congress. Beyond supporting principles of federalism, the federal interest in preserving
a state option for income taxation (even if not used at the federal level) would be to
prevent the rate of federal consumption taxes from being so high that they produce their
own forms of economic distortion and incentives for evasion.
16. A resolution adopted by the Multistate Tax Commission at its 1995 annual
meeting commits the Commission to "study[ing] and consider[ing] carefully the potential
for state administration of coordinated national taxes, including the use of an interstate
compact as a legal vehicle, consistent with preserving state authority within the federal
system, for establishing a coordinated system of national taxation within States
participating in the compact."
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were to enter the field of transactional consumption taxation long relied
upon by state governments as a major source of revenue.
States cannot afford to ignore the debate over the shape of the nation's
tax system. All of the major proposals for federal change will constrain
the tax choices available to the states to some degree. It is ironic that
as states are being assigned more expenditure responsibilities, they may
be left with fewer revenue choices. The choice that states can make now
is to try to influence the decisions of Congress that will vitally affect
their future tax authority and revenue systems.
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APPENDIXB
MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION RESOLUTION

IMPACTS ON STATE ADMINISTRATION OF PROPOSALS FOR MAJOR
FEDERAL TAX CHANGES

WHEREAS, a number of announced candidates for President in the
1996 election and members of the congressional leadership in both
parties have recently set forth detailed proposals or otherwise called for
major changes in fundamental federal tax policies, and
WHEREAS, several of these proposals call for enactment at the
federal level of a comprehensive transactional tax on consumption,
which has heretofore been almost exclusively a major source of revenue
for States and local governments, and
WHEREAS, enactment of such a tax would raise significant issues of
coordination with existing state and local sales taxes, would likely lead
to pressure to conform state and local sales taxes to the federal base, and
could constrain the ability of state and local governments to retain the
existing level of reliance on sales taxes or to achieve increases in sales
taxes that might be judged necessary in the future, and
WHEREAS, at least one announced proposal for a comprehensive
federal consumption tax contemplates its administration by the States on
behalf of the federal government, and
WHEREAS, some proposals for enactment of a comprehensive
transactional tax on consumption contemplate such a tax as a complete
substitute for federal corporate and personal income taxes, and
WHEREAS, elimination of the federal corporate and personal income
taxes would eliminate federal income tax legal frameworks, definitions,
income information reporting, tax withholding and tax auditing upon
which States depend critically for cost-effective enforcement of their
own taxes and thereby raise critical issues concerning the cost and
feasibility of instituting these requirements and activities at the state
level, and
WHEREAS, other proposals for comprehensive reform of the federal
personal income tax base, the substitution of a consumed-income tax for
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the personal income tax and the substitution of a business activities tax
for the federal corporate income tax would, given widespread, conformity to federal tax bases, similarly lead to major transitional adjustments
in state tax policy and administration, and
WHEREAS, some proposals for overhaul of the personal income tax
raise issues unique to States, such as a potentially greater share of the
consumed-income tax base becoming subject, not to deferred taxation at
the time of consumption, but rather permanent exemption if consumed
in a non-taxing State, and
·
WHEREAS, in sum, all of the major extant proposals for comprehensive federal tax reform have major implications for the ability of States
to retain their current tax policies and systems of tax administration, and
WHEREAS, the proponents of these proposals have given virtually
no indication that they are aware of their potential implications for
States, and
WHEREAS, interstate compacts represent a partnership approach
between Congress and the States that could be the means for coordinating overlapping federal and state taxes that is the most consistent with
the balance of power within our federal system of government
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Multistate Tax
Commission respectfully calls upon the Congress of the United States to
consider fully the potential impact on state tax policy prerogatives and
state tax administration of all proposals for comprehensive tax reform
that it may consider, to consult fully regarding these impacts with
all relevant organizations of state officials, including the Multistate Tax
Commission, prior to the mark-up of any such legislation, and to devote
at least one hearing on any such piece of legislation to its potential
impact on state taxation, and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the staff of the Multistate Tax
Commission will analyze all of the major proposals for comprehensive
reform of the federal tax system that are offered during the next several
years and advise the Member States with regard to their impact on the
ability and cost to the States of retaining their current systems of
taxation, and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Multistate Tax Commission
will seek to coordinate and serve as a clearinghouse for research by
Member State revenue agencies on the impacts of the various tax
overhaul proposals, and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Multistate Tax Commission
will work diligently to bring before the U.S. Congress and other state
government organizations all information available to it concerning the
impact of federal tax overhaul proposals on state taxation and to ensure
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that Congress considers these impacts in its consideration of these
proposals, and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Multistate Tax Commission
shall study and consider carefully the potential for state administration
of coordinated national taxes, including the use of an interstate compact
as a legal vehicle, consistent with preserving state authority within the
federal system, for establishing a coordinated system of national taxation
within States participating in the compact.
Adopted this 28th day of July, 1995, by the Multistate Tax Commission.
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